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Abstract
In recent years, the nudge approach to behavior change has emerged from
the behavioral sciences to challenge the traditional use of regulation in pub-
lic health strategies to address modifiable individual-level behaviors related
to the rise of noncommunicable diseases and their treatment. However, in-
tegration and testing of the nudge approach as part of more comprehensive
public health strategies aimed at making healthy choices easier are being
threatened by inadequate understandings of its scientific character, its rela-
tionshipwith regulation, and its ethical implications. This article reviews this
character and its ethical implication with a special emphasis on the compati-
bility of nudging with traditional regulation, special domains of experience,
and the need for a more nuanced approach to the ethical debate. The aim is
to advance readers’ understanding and give guidance to those who have con-
sidered working with or incorporating the nudge approach into programs
or policies aimed at making healthful choices easier.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the world, societies face major challenges and massive governmental spending in the
public health sector. In particular, the rise of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs)—notably can-
cers, cardiovascular diseases, and diabetes—has, for decades, presented a broad series of challenges
to governments in terms of promoting health and reducing the economic and social burden of
disease and disability (2). Although these challenges are clearly known to correlate with variables
such as social level, age, and gender, among others, they are also known to be largely preventable by
reducing exposure to four main risk factors—tobacco smoking, unhealthful diet, physical inactiv-
ity, and excessive alcohol consumption (67). Most of these challenges have in common that they
are closely associated with the consequences of modifiable individual-level behaviors, where—
looking at it from a public health perspective—people fail to perform rationally in their own
declared self-interests.
Public health promotion has traditionally relied on education, information, guidelines, cam-
paigns, social influences, school and workplace programs, and product labeling, not only to per-
suade the individual to prefer more healthy lifestyles, but also to make more rational decisions
relative to these preferences (42). However, during the past four decades, advances in behavioral
economics and cognitive and social psychology (henceforth, the behavioral and social sciences)
have revealed how human behavior and decisionmaking is bounded rational, systematically biased,
and unavoidably habitual owing to the interplay of psychological forces, with what ought to be,
from the perspective of rationality, irrelevant features of complex decision-making contexts (21).
Thus, one challenge, which has appeared relative to informed health policy, is determining how
to modify individual-level behavior toward people’s own declared self-interest despite that people
are bound to make mistakes in conforming to rational standards in their behavior and decision
making.
In their book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness (53), behavioral
economistRichardThaler and legal scholarCassR. Sunstein have suggested that the very cognitive
boundaries, biases, and habits that cause these mistakes may be systematically utilized by private
and public institutions tomodify individual-level behaviors in people’s own declared self-interests.
They label any such intervention as a nudge and, in addition to effectively bridging gaps between
preferences and behavior, they also suggest that nudges may avoid some of the challenges and
potential pitfalls of traditional regulation, such as costly procedures and ineffective campaigning,
unintended effects of incentivizing behaviors, and invasive choice regulation such as bans. In
particular, the authors emphasize that despite their choice-preserving nature nudges may provide
the basis for a wider regulatory strategy to modify individual-level behaviors in people’s own
declared self-interest, a concept known as libertarian paternalism.
Since the publication of Nudge, its ideas have gained widespread traction and have diffused
or have been disseminated into many different sectors of public policy, including public health,
where it has challenged assumptions of standard regulation efforts. It has led to the emergence of
a field of applied behavioral science referred to as nudging, which is in its infancy and comprises
a mix of cross-disciplinary academics, policy makers, practitioners, and consultants with a wide
range of backgrounds, competencies, and ideas about what they are doing. Thus, the systematic
use of nudges to induce behavior change, such as making healthful choices easier, has yet to
develop. In particular, the process of implementing and testing the nudge approach, as an element
of a comprehensive public health strategy, is currently being threatened by inadequate under-
standings of the scientific nature, status, and implications of nudging as well as a range of common
speculations and suspicions about nudging relative to regulation in the public health community.
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WHAT IS NUDGING?
Over the past four decades, advances in the behavioral sciences have revealed how human behavior
and decision making is boundedly rational (i.e., the idea that rational decision making is limited
by the contextually available information, the cognitive limitations of the decision maker, and
the time available to make the decision), systematically biased, and unavoidably habitual owing to
the interplay of psychological forces with what ought to be, from the perspective of rationality,
irrelevant features of complex decision-making contexts (21). These behavioral insights teach us
how decision-making contexts may systematically lead people to fail in acting on well-informed
preferences and thus fail to achieve their preferred ends, e.g., by making people focus on short-
term preferences for chocolate relative to long-term preferences for health and well-being. In
the domain of public health, such advances may also teach us how neglecting these insights can
be responsible for the failures of health policies to reach intended effects and why paying more
attention to themmay provide the key to dealing more effectively with the main preventive public
health risk factors, problems in treatment, etc.
Nudge
In Nudge, Thaler & Sunstein (53) suggest that nudges may avoid some of the challenges and
potential pitfalls of traditional regulation, such as costly procedures and ineffective campaigning,
unintended effects of incentivizing behaviors, and invasive choice regulation, such as bans. They
suggest that, if a particular unfortunate behavioral pattern is the result of cognitive boundaries,
biases, or habits, this pattern may instead be nudged toward improvement by integrating the
very same kind of boundaries, biases, and habits into our physical, social, and mental contexts
in ways that serve a more preferred behavior rather than obstruct it. The proclaimed advantage
of applying nudges is that public policy makers might thus supplement—or, perhaps, even
replace (53, p. 14)—traditional regulation with nudges to influence people’s everyday choices
and behaviors in cheaper, less invasive, and more effective ways. That is, nudging seems to offer
policy makers an effective way to influence citizens’ behavior without further restricting freedom
of choice, imposing mandatory obligations, or introducing new taxations, or tax reliefs. Thaler
& Sunstein coined the seemingly oxymoronic term, libertarian paternalism, to characterize the
attractive regulation paradigm that intuitively arises out of the nudge strategy to behavioral
change in public policy making, when enacted to serve the interests of the citizens as these are
judged by themselves (20). In their original definition of a nudge, the absence of traditional
(health) policy strategies is even invoked as a formal condition:
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in
a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.
To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates.
Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not. (53, p. 6)
However, later theoretical work has shown that this way of defining a nudge easily conflates
what is a descriptive behavioral concept with that of a separate political doctrine of libertarian
paternalism (20). Instead, a nudge may be defined in a more precise and consistent way, relative
to the behavioral sciences, that avoids such conflation:
A nudge is a function of (condition I) any attempt at influencing people’s judgment, choice or behavior
in a predictableway according to their own self-declared interests (condition a) that ismotivated because
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of cognitive boundaries, biases, routines, and habits in individual and social decision-making posing
barriers for people to perform rationally in their own self-declared interests, and which (condition b)
works by making use of those boundaries, biases, routines, and habits as integral parts of such attempts.
(20, p. 37)
By this definition, the operational independence of nudges as to regulation is not a formal
condition, but an implication. That is, the original definition of a nudge provided by Thaler &
Sunstein (53) is actually a consequence of the more fundamental definition provided by Hansen
(20), which is important to notice because this means that even though nudges can operate in-
dependently from regulation, they are not required to. Thus, a nudge may be combined with
traditional regulation approaches but works independently of (a) forbidding or adding any ratio-
nally relevant choice options; (b) changing incentives, whether regarded in terms of time, trouble,
social sanctions, economics, etc.; or (c) the provision of factual information and rational argumen-
tation. A simple definition proposes that a nudge is any part of an intervention that should not
mean anything in principle but does in practice.
Nudging
Today the systematic use of nudges in creating behavior change is referred to as the field of nudging
and, as a discipline, is increasing its influence on public policy worldwide. A key institution in this
development has been the establishment of the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in 2009 by UK
Prime Minister David Cameron. The BIT rolled out of government to become partly privatized
in 2014. Since 2009, nudge units, initiatives, and networks have followed, including the United
States (66), Denmark (http://danishnudgingnetwork.dk/Om/index.html), Germany (44), and
Canada (10), among others. Likewise the European Union, the OECD, and The World Bank
have published reports, held meetings, and actively supported research to further examine the
potential of nudging (36, 43, 68). Although these efforts have led to the emergence of the field,
nudging is only in its infancy.
Still, a common scientific framework of reference unites these efforts. In particular, nudging
relies heavily on theories and methodology from behavioral economics as well as from cognitive
and social psychology, using microeconomic decision theory as a base. A central focus within the
field is the biases and heuristics program of Nobel prize winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, which is rooted in dual-process theories of cognition and information processing (32,
54–55) as made accessible to the wider public by Kahneman’s (31) dual-system theory presented
in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
Dual-process theories vary greatly but generally share the overarching structure of positing
two types of human information processing—automatic and nonautomatic—in explaining and
predicting human behavior (12). Using David Marr’s (38) distinction between computational,
algorithmic, and implementation-level theories of psychology, the explanatory function of dual-
process theories may be located at the algorithmic level of analysis where mental mechanisms
that translate inputs into outputs are identified. Identifying processes according to the simplified
distinction of whether they operate in an automatic and nonautomatic fashion—i.e., (a) when there
is conscious awareness, (b) when there is no goal to start the effort, (c) when cognitive resources
are reduced, and (d ) when there is no goal to alter or stop the process—these theories thus seek to
explain how supposedly irrelevant features of decision-making contexts systematically influence
human decision making and behavior (15).
In addition to the shared psychological underpinnings, the widespread efforts falling under the
auspices of nudging are unified by the ambition to apply quantitative experimental approaches
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to validate field research results. The choice of this methodological approach may be ascribed
to the intellectual origins in the standard laboratory experiments used in behavioral economics.
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are explicitly formulated as the ideal in, for example, the
BIT’s 2012 report, Test, Learn and Adapt (27). However, the objective of nudging is just as much
about evaluating the efficacy and policy implications of nudge interventions and examining the
potential real-world feasibility and applicability of behavioral insights as it is about extending the
boundaries of scientific knowledge. Hence, the aspirations of nudging as currently carried out
have much in common with what is generally referred to as real-world research, and the research
relationship sought between stakeholders may best be characterized by Hall & Hall (1996)1:
The research relationship is between equals, and is not exploitative: the client organization is not being
“used” merely to develop academic theory or careers nor is the academic community being “used”
(brains being picked). There is genuine exchange. The research is negotiated. (17)
Despite the various versions of this ideal being adopted by core practitioners of nudging, the
cross-sectorial nature of current efforts has undoubtedly prompted some speculation and suspicion.
One set of worries pertains to the threat of science being utilized by policy makers to manipulate
citizens. Another set of worries pertains to whether nudging is being used as an excuse to roll
back traditional regulatory efforts. This latter worry has been most prominent in Europeans’
response to nudging; the US response has been worried more about the paternalistic aspects of
the approach. Not surprisingly, the issue of nudging versus traditional regulation has perhaps been
most outspoken within the sector of public health.
MAKING HEALTHY CHOICES EASIER
Throughout the world, societies currently facemajor challenges andmassive governmental spend-
ing in the medical care sector, in particular with regard to the rise of NCDs that are closely asso-
ciated with the consequences of modifiable individual-level behaviors, where—looking at it from
a public health perspective—people fail to perform rationally in their own declared self-interests.
This perspective seems reasonable because, given a trivial choice, few citizens probably prefer to
live unhealthfully or suffer from disability and disease. Hence, public health has been perceived
as a natural candidate for nudging [cf. condition (a) of the definition of a nudge].
Against this background, one of the basic slogans of nudging—“make it easy”—could not be
better timed in health policy, although practitioners or researchers may deem it to be too vague,
over simplified, potentially deceptive, over reliant on individuals making the right choice, and too
weak to lead to sustainable behavior change. Although it is true that when simplified, nudging
is very much about promoting certain choices by making them easy, this concept is intended in
the technical sense of developing evidence-based clever ways of making target choices cognitively
“easy” or “intuitive” to perform against the background of dual-process theories. This is done,
for example, by making target choices psychologically salient, intuitive to navigate, associatively
attractive, and clearly endorsed by the social environment in the context of often counterintuitive
theoretical insights. The background of the public health challenges themselves is a useful place
to determine the efficacy of this strategy.
1This sentiment and method has become pervasive and operationalized in community-based participatory research (e.g. 29,
39) and in public health program evaluation and medical quality-improvement studies.
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Making Unhealthful Choices Easier
Public health challenges may be considered, in part, the result of nudging, albeit as a consequence
of nudges that are not conducive to health. For example, within the world of food and beverages,
producers and retailers are highly aware of the importance of consumer preferences and habits in
influencing purchasing behaviors. Although the prevailing view among economic operators is that
marketing acts solely to facilitate consumer choice by providing information about different brands
and products, evidence in the public health and psychology literatures suggest that marketing and
other forms of promotion can alter perceptions and attitudes and can increase preferences for both
branded and nonbranded foods; they can also influence consumption patterns and diet-related
behaviors (e.g., can affect generic food selection patterns and dietary intake) (5–6, 16, 26).
Evidence also indicates that providers of goods and services use prices for differentiatedproducts
to nudge consumer preferences and habits (9). A company may thus design the entire marketing
mix around its prices to raise demand, such as by identifying that the targetmarket, say low-income
consumers, can afford only a certain price for a product, and then design and position the product
around that price. Such strategies used by food companies to achieve marketing objectives include
price skimming (setting a relatively high price at first and then lowering the price over time),
penetration pricing (setting a relatively low initial entry price to attract new customers), prestige
pricing (setting a high price for a product to evoke high quality), and promotional pricing (e.g.,
sales promotions, loss leaders) (11). Industry argues that such price promotions are necessary in a
competitive market, but evidence shows that the principal effect is to cause consumers to purchase
more frequently or to buy more on each visit; thus, the effect on demand is much greater than that
on brand switching (24, 47). Hence, conscious strategies, such as supersized plates in fast-food
outlets, sizing-up of portions for packaged foods and fizzy drinks, when combined with what Brian
Wansink (61) has famously dubbed “mindless eating” in his book by the same name, may lead to
a mindless increase in consumption.
Furthermore, an emerging body of evidence suggests that food companies create products that
aim to maximize appeal to innate taste preferences, thus contributing to the creation of habits for
foods high in saturated fat, sugar, and/or salt, which have been implicated in the rise of obesity
and diet-related NCDs; repeated exposure to specific food products or ingredients may heighten
people’s appetites and can induce overeating, which may very well lead to weight gain. Possible
mechanisms include influencing taste and texture perception and sensory reward, which in turn
affects our ability to regulate food intake as sensory signals from food are disconnected from
metabolic properties (28, 34–35, 37, 59).
The evidence discussed above has been complemented by public health literature that has con-
sidered the importance of “food environments” and “food deserts” in determining the availability
and affordability of food options for consumers, which influence dietary patterns and the nutri-
tional quality of diets (25, 48, 52). The assumption is that far from being consumer driven, what
consumers eat is being shaped by the food market environment (i.e., the decisions and actions
of producers and retailers), whether it be through advertising and marketing, the availability of
high-calorie food, and of course their relatively low prices. Hence, claiming that no evidence has
shown that nudging works to create sustainable behavior change is difficult to defend when, in
fact, nudges have played a crucial role in food companies making unhealthful choices easier.
Making Healthful Choices Easier
The question is not so much, then, whether nudges work effectively for creating sustainable
behavior change, but rather whether nudging is an effective and ethically admissible strategy to
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pursue when it comes to promoting healthful choices relative to the public health perception. To
assess the potential effectiveness of nudging in making healthful choices easier, we consider some
of the instructive domains within or close to public health to which real-world nudge experiments
and interventions have recently been or are currently being devised.
Registering for organ donation. In countries where people can register to be organ donors,
surveys have shown many times how citizens who prefer to be registered as organ donors have, in
fact, failed to follow through with registration (23). Thus registering for organ donation has been
perceived as a natural candidate for nudging [cf. condition (a) of the definition]. In their classic
article, Goldstein et al. (30) showed how opt-out schemes produce much higher registration levels
for organ donation relative to opt-in schemes. This occurrence aligns with a robust finding in the
behavioral sciences that inertia leads to a status quo bias, i.e., a strong tendency for humans to go
with whatever is the default option. That is, even though defaults ought not to play any role in
decisionmaking in principle, it does so in practice.Changing the default of a given decision-making
context is considered a basic and strong nudge functionwithin the nudge approach. For this reason,
it seems logical that any integrated and comprehensive public health strategywanting to implement
nudging could consider nudging registration for organ donation by changing the default.
Although Thaler & Sunstein (18) have often been presumed to agree with this position, this
assumption is actually not true; they prefer to nudge this kind of issue using prompted choice
because of ethical considerations similar to those addressed below and because they feel that the
real behavioral problem is not getting people to say yes, but is instead getting citizens to register
their stance on organ donation—whether that is a “yes” or “no”—a case of negotiating the problem
as mentioned above. Wanting to test prompted choice for organ donation, which itself may be
considered a nudge (18), the Danish Nudging Network together with the Danish Ministry of
Health and the main public webpage addressing public health issues (https://www.sundhed.dk/)
tested, in 2015, the effect of adding a pop-up window to this webpage for one month—a pop-up
merely encouraging visitors to take a stance-on-taking-a-stance on their organ donor registration
status. About 11,000 more updates were made to the donor registry compared with the previous
four-month average, an increase of more than 250%. The number of clicks on the pop-up window
during the intervention month translated to 7% of overall front-page landings for the webpage
that month (P.G. Hansen, unpublished findings; data available on request). These observations
strongly suggest that the pop-up window nudged relatively more Danes into action in a relatively
cheap way, namely by checking in with their registration status, which in Denmark is set to a
default “no,” and presumably aligning it with their preferences.
As shown by an RCT conducted by the BIT in the UK, however, even the presentation of
the request in a pop-up—in this case, to join the register—may be a platform for nudging by
means of using framing effects (23). The framing effect is a hallmark of Kahneman & Tversky’s
(55) research, which shows that often choices are not as much about outcomes as they are about
the formulation of outcomes. That is, the framing effect is a cognitive bias by which people react
to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it is presented to them—e.g., whether
expressed in terms of losses or of gains. In the UK experiment, more than 1,000,000 individuals
were presented with 1 of 8 different prompts (more than 135,000 individuals per prompt), each
framing separate nudge functions such as reciprocity, losses, gains, and social proof (with and
without pictures of people) as well as a control prompt. During the trial, 1,203 more people
registered under the best-performing variant, compared with the control group. This difference
would lead to ∼96,000 additional completed registrations compared with the control (assuming
all other factors are equal) over the course of a year. Hence, themere presentation and formulation
of a prompt to register for organ donation are candidates for nudging.
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Making healthful consumption choices easier. As indicated in the example of organ donation
registration, nudging tends to be a hands-on or context-specific approach to behavior change. As
such, it differs, both in its development and proximity to context, frommore traditional regulations
that attempt to change behavior from a distance by providing information, incentives, and rules
that generalize across contexts. This context specificity becomes even more obvious when the goal
is to make healthful choices easier relative to consumption patterns related to NCDs.
For instance, during the past decades, observational data demonstrates that plate sizes have in-
creased significantly (3, 57, 64). This increase is problematic with regard to healthy consumption
because plate sizes interact with habits in the sense that they create the visual context that deter-
mines the success feedback signal, i.e., the stop signal, with regard to filling one’s plate. Hence,
plate size functions as a determinant of portion size (49, 63) owing to the tendency of individuals
to misjudge relative self-service [cf. the Delboeuf Illusion (41)]. Thus, one may help reverse the
road to obesity by making plates smaller in canteen and restaurant settings, which is supported
by laboratory experiment findings showing that reducing plate size led to reductions in calorie
intake (50, 60). In addition to such habit effects, various order and arrangement effects may also
be used to nudge healthful choices to become easier during out-of-home eating. In a real-world
controlled experiment on conference snacking, investigators invoked the order effect (by offering
fruit at the front of the table) together with a default serving size during coffee breaks that offered
fruit and cake to 400 executives. The results showed a 30% decrease in cake consumption and
an 84% increase in fruit consumption (22). In another laboratory experiment (62), renaming and
labeling vegetable dishes with fun or attractive names resulted in a 16% increase in consumption,
suggesting that even the mere labeling of choices may be used to nudge more healthful consump-
tion, and in the setting of a recent supermarket experiment, sales of sliced fruit almost tripled by
placing it at the counter (P.G. Hansen, unpublished findings; data available on request). How-
ever, even though an abundance of such successful experiments has shown the potential effects of
isolated nudge functions in making healthful choices easier, more comprehensive studies of the
effect of bundling these approaches in particular contexts are rare. However, in a recent exper-
iment where a broad series of nudges, based on everything from signs encouraging consumers
to combine particular popular vegetables with particular less known ones to space management
based on cognitive maps, were implemented in an average Danish supermarket for 5 weeks, total
fruit sales went up by 29% and total vegetable sales went up by 21% (a review of these findings is
under way).
Such nudge functions are so context specific, however, that the only way to integrate them
into a comprehensive public health strategy seems to be by incorporating them as part of food
outlet staff education. But would counter interests in businesses hamper such attempts, as is often
thought? Not necessarily. Experiments such as that of labeling vegetables have led to increased
sales of the isolated good. Also, in the supermarket study mentioned above, the total turnover
of the supermarket went up by 2.6%. Even positive side effects may result, as illustrated by an
experiment implementing smaller plates in a Nordic hotel chain; the experiment’s goal was to
reduce food waste and resulted in not only 22% reductions in food waste, but also significant
economic savings (33). Thus, the interests of profit may not contradict attempts to make healthful
choices easier.
Making unhealthful choices more difficult. Although healthful choices are theoretically the
opposite of unhealthful choices (choosing an apple is the opposite of choosing not to take the
apple), there is a psychological difference between actions that need to be taken and actions that
result from inhibiting action. Thus it makes sense to talk not only about making healthful choices
easier, but also about making unhealthful choices more difficult.
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In a recent experiment in the United Kingdom and closer to the discipline of behavioral
economics, two programs for quitting cigarettes were pitched: (a) one where smokers deposit
$150, which they can get back if they stop smoking, along with $650 extra, and (b) one in which
people receive $800 if they stop smoking. Although investigators expected no difference from a
standard economic point of view, the behavioral economics hypothesis based on loss aversion was
confirmed, such that 52.3% of those enrolled in the deposit program had sustained abstinence for
6 months, as compared with just 17.1% of those enrolled in the reward program. However, only
13.7% of the participants assigned to the deposit program chose to enroll in it, whereas 90.0%
of those assigned to the reward program chose to enroll (51). Even though the nudge program
based on loss aversion was highly effective in getting subjects to abstain, the low adoption rate
made for a lesser overall effect compared with that of the reward program. An experiment such
as this, in addition to being a case of making unhealthful choices more difficult, points out two
key observations. First, we should expect that nudge interventions, which are different from more
traditional regulation, are bound to be developed in incremental steps—e.g., in the experiment
mentioned above, additional work needs to be done to increase adoption rates. Second, even if
interventions are successful, such nudges need to be evaluated relative to alternatives of regulation
and incentive-based strategies in order to choose the most effective means to make unhealthful
choices more difficult and healthful choices easier.
As a second and final illustrative example of nudges aimed at making unhealthful choices more
difficult, we consider the proposed Big Gulp Ban of New York Mayor Bloomberg. Close to
defaults lies the use of signaling or communicating standards by ranges (i.e., large, medium, small)
and orders (first dish, second dish, third dish in a buffet sequence), among others. For instance,
default choices may, in themselves, create a signal, i.e., produce expectations, of what is standard
or what is reasonable and acceptable. A well-known example of this effect is found by increasing
the default sizes of fizzy drinks, for example, which lead to significant health effects by increasing
consumption (58). Thus, the idea that decreasing default sizes and available ranges to nudge a
decrease in consumption seems quite reasonable within an integrated and comprehensive public
health strategy. Thus, New York Mayor Bloomberg suggested banning Big Gulp soft drinks in
out-of-home settings to nudge down consumption. AlthoughThaler, author ofNudge, argued that
this strategy would not be a nudge but a ban, the revised definition of a nudge actually shows how
the BigGulp Ban qualifies as a nudge, at least for that part of the decrease in consumption that may
not be fully explained by price effects; one can buy two Half Gulps instead of one Big Gulp, and
the ban is on the industry, not on the citizen. Furthermore, Wansink, author of Mindless Eating,
was quick to argue that the strategy would not be effective because people would always get what
they want; however, most commentators did not agree that it would not be effective. Ultimately,
industry lobbying successfully prevented the Big Gulp ban, but any integrated and comprehensive
public health strategy wanting to implement nudging should look seriously to possible regulations
of standards (1).
THE ETHICS OF NUDGING
With its widespread traction and dissemination into public policy combined with its straightfor-
ward challenge of the assumptions of traditional regulation, nudging has not surprisingly provoked
political, practical, and ethical skepticism and criticism from academics and public commentators
alike (21). Especially the ethics of nudging has turned out to be a recurring theme, as nudging
aims to create behavioral changes, including choices, by subtle interventions in the very contexts
in which people work and live. Unfortunately, the debate about the ethics of nudging has often
been sidetracked by repeated theoretical misunderstandings made by commentators coming from
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outside this new and emerging field who have misinterpreted the premises and who have been
allowed to make various claims about nudging without being required to commit themselves to
a fixed and consistent position. Thus, by now a series of standard accusations pertaining to the
ethics of nudging have been rehearsed. To help anyone who considers working with nudging as
part of a public health strategy with regard to the ethics of nudge, we have highlighted some of
the main themes and answers.
Ethical Concerns
A persistent and central accusation in the ethical debate has been the claim that nudging works by
manipulating people’s choices (4, 56, 65). This claim is important for two reasons. First, it seems to
make the approach incompatible with public policy making in a modern democracy. Second, it is
fundamental to various other criticisms of the approach, such as the claim “that the psychological
mechanisms that are exploited work best in the dark,” and thus the effects of nudges are likely to
decrease or even disappear if nudges become transparent, and the claim that nudging invites abuse
of power by technocrats (13, 46). In Europe, this criticism has been accompanied by a concern
that nudging will be used as an excuse to roll back regulation toward a more libertarian state,
whereas opponents in the United States are concerned predominantly with whether nudging is
state paternalism in disguise (40, 46) [and that nudging impairs our autonomy and our ability to
make moral choices for ourselves (14)].
Thaler & Sunstein (53) seem to admit as much: Nudging is about manipulation of choices
(p. 82). But they generally dismiss the above criticisms with a three-pronged defense. First, they
claim that our choices are always being influenced by the context of choice, whether we like it
or not, making the antinudge position a literal nonstarter (53, p. 10). This is backed by a second
claim, that because nudges work without limiting the original set of choices, or without fiddling
with existing incentives, citizens remain free to choose the less healthy option. When even these
two claims do not put worries to rest, the final claim is that, if nudging guided by libertarian
paternalism and a Rawlsian publicity principle (which can be summarized as a principle that bans
government from selecting a policy that it would not be able or willing to defend publicly to its
own citizens), the relevant political and normative concerns are met (53, pp. 244–45).
However, some opponents have argued that this line of defense is less than perfect and easily
comes to serve as a decoy (21). Although it is true that our choices and, more generally, our
behavior are always influenced by the decision-making context, the intentional character of nudge
interventions being aimed at affecting behavior change unavoidably ascribes one with certain
responsibilities. Any configuration of space management in supermarkets or default setting of
fizzy drink sizes may, in fact, influence behavior and choices; however, if someone intentionally
arranges these to modify individual-level behaviors, responsibilities accrue. This observation, in
particular, pinpoints that antinudging arguments are rarely about nudging per se, but rather seek
to guard against someone (e.g., the state) taking responsibility in unwarranted contexts (i.e., what
and how much we should eat or drink in private). Claiming that we are always being nudged may
be used by proponents of nudging to avoid that debate.
In addition, these responsibilities cannot be dismissed by merely pointing out that nudges are
liberty preserving as amatter of principle. Although the perception of preserving liberty is accurate
in principle, that citizens are free to choose otherwise, one can hardly apply this perception in every
practical context because the nudge approach to behavior change is applied exactly in contexts
where we tend to fall short of such principles. This point becomes especially clear in the context of
organ donation registration (18). The transition from an opt-in system to an opt-out system may
be liberty preserving in principle. In practice, such a transition may be expected to move toward
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registration those individuals who prefer to be registered; however, the change also affects those
who do not prefer to be registered such that status quo bias will now work against this portion of
the population. Of course, one may come up with utilitarian reasons for endorsing such a policy,
but then the defense is no longer one that concerns the principal liberty-preserving nature of
nudges.
Finally, relying on Rawls’ publicity principle may seem to be an ethically insufficient safeguard.
Governments may, and have been willing to, defend many policies publicly that did not hold up
to ethical scrutiny. In addition, if nudging is manipulation of choice and invites abuse by policy
makers, then the need tomake such a defensewould hardly come into play because, ifmanipulative,
nobody would likely notice.
A Framework for Assessing the Ethical Acceptability and Implications of Nudges
One could argue that nudges are not necessarily manipulative in the ethically relevant sense, i.e.,
the psychological sense of manipulation whereby intervention, intention, and means are episte-
mologically nontransparent (21). Rather, many nudges are straightforwardly transparent, such as
the function of placing sliced-up fruit in a fridge at the supermarket check-out counter [an increase
of purchases of sliced-up fruit by 3000% (a review of these findings is under way)] or setting up a
prominent cauliflower sign to suggest boiling it with potatoes (purchases of cauliflower up 45%
(a review of these findings is under way)]. Hence introducing an epistemic distinction between
transparent and nontransparent nudges may serve as a basis for distinguishing the manipulative
use of nudges from other types of uses, as well as for preserving liberty, not only in principle but
also in practice. Still, many nudges may be regarded as manipulative in the psychological sense,
e.g., reducing or increasing plate size imperceptibly or using framing to get patients or doctors
to favor a certain treatment, and epistemic transparency depends on individual variables, such
as when the effects of default size or ordering of options for fizzy drinks may be transparent to
behavioral economists but not to their kids.
Likewise, one could argue that because nudges target reflective choices as well as automatic
kinds of behaviors, such as attention, routines, and habits, the responsibilities and expectations
attributed (or transferred) to the individuals targeted by the nudge differ accordingly. That is,
whereas the nontransparent framing (i.e., manipulation) of medical treatment as well as the trans-
parent salience-making and suggestion of cauliflower both aim to attribute the responsibility of
choice to individuals, the nontransparent reduction of plate size to lower consumption by tapping
into automatic cues or the transparent playing of music when airplanes take off to relax passengers
aims at more automatic behavioral responses that do not usually attribute responsibility to the
individuals targeted.
Combining these two distinctions—transparent/nontransparent, with regard to manipulation,
and reflective/automatic, with regard to ascribed responsibility—provides a conceptual framework
to characterize four types of nudges (see Figure 1). This frameworkmay provide a central compo-
nent for more nuanced ethical considerations, clear up some of the confusion that surrounds the
ethical discussion of the nudge approach to behavior change, and better inform its adoption in the
attempt to make healthful choices easier, within an integrated and comprehensive public health
strategy (21). In addition, the framework also reveals why it is not true that nudges work best in
the dark or that effects are likely to decrease or disappear if nudges become transparent (fruit at
the counter seems to make the opposite case). Rather, the feature of transparency may operate
as an ethical filter, making individuals immune when nudges are not aligned with the targeted
individual’s interest. In the same manner, the framework may be used to evaluate the ethics of
possible side effects with regard to autonomy.
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Reflective
(choice)
Automatic
(behavior)
NontransparentTransparent
Figure 1
A framework for assessing attributed responsibility and manipulation to assign functions of interventions
into one of four categories.
Policy Concerns
Still, this framework does not satisfy the policy concerns regarding the potential abuse of power
by technocrats, nudging as paternalism in disguise, nudging as an excuse to roll back the state to
a more libertarian one or to give the state more invisible power, and the impact of nudging on
autonomy. However, many of the claims against nudging actually pertain to regulating systems
at large (19), an important point that is usually overlooked in discussions about the ethics of
nudging. For instance, most incentive schemes are practically nontransparent to citizens as well
as to stakeholders in the relevant decision-making contexts. Few people know which taxes pertain
to a chocolate bar or are familiar with the detailed information about cancer therapy and how
the associated risk portfolio has been calculated. Likewise, Microsoft Windows and Apple iOS
systems certainly impaired most people’s ability to write in DOS code; Google created a similar
limitation for library references. Yet, we do not feel as though our autonomy has been impaired or
that we lost our ability to make moral choices for ourselves. But more importantly, such concerns
show that the issues do not pertain to nudging alone.
That said, among these more complex policy discussions, one issue remains a widespread
concern within public health circles: that nudging is an approach that aims to roll back the state
to a more libertarian one. At the root of this concern is confusion among researchers about the
relation between nudging and the concept of libertarian paternalism, where nudges and libertarian
paternalism are often discussed as synonymous (see also 7–8, 45). Libertarian paternalism is not
clear in whether it aims to substitute hard regulation with soft paternalism as a target in itself, but
wemust stress, as argued at length elsewhere (20), that nudging and libertarian paternalism are two
very different things that should not be conflated. Nudges do not need to be cases of libertarian
paternalism (we may nudge you to eat too many chocolate bars) nor do interventions that qualify
as cases of libertarian paternalism need to be nudges (the government may send you a very dry
informational brochure about health and nutrition standards). Nudging is a new and aspiring
scientific field that offers evidence-based approaches aimed to create behavioral changes in many
ways that may potentially supplement as well as substitute existing regulation in a comprehensive
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health strategy.Decisions of whether and how this should be done need to be based on case-by-case
assessment relative to the effectiveness and public acceptability of the nudge in question.
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